THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

In February 2007, fifteen environmental philosophers gathered for two days of meetings at the University of North Texas. Their purpose: to discuss the future of their field. Nearly four decades past the first Earth Day and the first philosophic discussions concerning our relationship to the Earth, environmental philosophy finds itself at a crossroads. While the field has made real progress over the last generation—and the environmental challenges we face have only grown in importance—environmental philosophy has struggled to find a real home and ready audience. On the one hand, despite its decades-long effort to construct a sound theoretical foundation, the field still lacks academic bona fides within the larger discipline of philosophy. For some within philosophy, environmental philosophy does not qualify as "real" philosophy: it is too topical, insufficiently theoretical in its deliberations, and tainted by an impulse toward advocacy. On the other hand, within the larger worlds of environmental science, engineering, and public policy, environmental philosophers are sometimes criticized as being too abstract and too distant from real world environmental challenges.

With these mixed signals in mind, the participants in this meeting came together to discuss:
• What constitutes the field of environmental ethics/philosophy? What counts as competence, its canon, and its central questions? What value does it add to other fields and disciplines? Is environmental philosophy even “philosophy”?
• What is the role of environmental philosophy in various curricula (philosophy departments, environmental studies programs, general education, health sciences, natural resources)?
• What is the role of environmental ethics in policy processes?
• How can graduate education in environmental philosophy be strengthened, both at the MA and Ph.D. levels? What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and barriers of “stand alone” programs versus programs that are embedded in disciplinary degree programs?
• What is the state of publishing in the field? How can the dedicated journals be improved? How can work in environmental philosophy be more widely disseminated?
• Meetings: What is the state of conferencing?
• Who should be the target audiences of environmental philosophy? How important is it for environmental philosophers to develop relationships with government agencies, policy-makers, scientists, and other communities and institutions? How can such relationships be fostered? And, how important is it for environmental philosophers to function as “public intellectuals”?

The essays collected here—limited to brief, succinct statements—seek to delimit the challenges faced by environmental philosophy, and to sketch out alternative paths into the future.

Robert Frodeman
Dale Jamieson
The old guy in *The Graduate* had just one word for Dustin Hoffman’s character, Ben: “plastics.” This old guy has three words for the future pursuit of environmental philosophers, young and old: global climate change (GCC).

GCC is emerging as the central environmental concern of the 21st century. Back in the 20th century, E. O. Wilson’s mantra was (I paraphrase) ‘abrupt mass anthropogenic species extinction is the crime for which posterity is least likely to forgive us.’ In view of the multifaceted catastrophe graphically depicted in the recent acclaimed film, *An Inconvenient Truth* (*AIT*), Wilson’s dictum seems quaint. Rather, a world whose very geography will be anthropogenically altered by risen sea levels, whose weather will be increasingly violent and erratic, whose seas will be stagnant and acidified by carbonic acid, etc., etc., is the crime for which posterity is least likely to forgive us—if there is any posterity to make a judgment.

According to Al Gore in *AIT* anthropogenic GCC is a “moral” and “ethical” issue. But he doesn’t elaborate. And at the end of the film he provides a lame list of things you and you and you and you—all of us individually AND voluntarily—can do to mitigate GCC, such as swap out halogen light bulbs for compact florescent ones and drive a hybrid car. Think “tragedy of the commons” for the efficacy of that approach to an adequate ethical response to the challenge of GCC.

Gore’s naivete apart, environmental ethics (EE) as we know it is singularly ill-prepared for dealing with GCC. The problem is one of scale, temporal as well as spatial. Spatially, EE concern was focused on the scale of biotic communities, ecosystems, and landscapes. And the relevant science was ecology. Temporally, the scale was also ecological: It might take Prince William Sound half a century, perhaps even a whole century, to fully recover from the Exxon Valdez spill. In temperate climates, after a clearcut a mature forest might spring up in a century and, through ecological succession, if left alone it will return to old growth in 300 years. Back in the 20th century that seemed like a long time, and we lamented that the ecological temporal scale and the economic temporal scale of
industries like the timber business and the oil business were out of phase, the former measured in decades the latter in quarters. But now, elderly environmental philosophers like me will personally witness little more than the initial environmental consequences of GCC—the occasional Katrina, the occasional hottest year on record, the disappearance of glaciers in Glacier National Park. We won’t live to see (I hope) the cessation of the Gulf Stream or sea-levels rise more than a few centimeters. And the rectification of these consequences will be completed, if they ever are, only after thousands of years have elapsed.

How then do we scale EE up to meet the moral challenge of GCC? Spatially we have a huge leap to make from the landscape scale to the biospheric scale. We have to become conversant with a new set of sciences; the relevant sciences are not ecology and conservation biology, but biogeochemistry and earth-systems science.

Is a GCC EE even possible? Maybe ethics has temporal-scale limits? We used to marvel at the long view of the Iroquois who considered the consequences of present policies out seven generations. Wow! At 25 years per generation that is all of 250 years (adding on the 75-year life-span of the 7th generation). Can we have ethical concern for the 37th generation, a thousand years out? Or the 121st generation 3000 years out?

THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Robert Frodeman

Our field is in the midst of a reorientation away from the issues and concerns of its first period (1975 through the mid 1990s). There are four areas that I believe should characterize our next steps:

1. Redefining ‘philosophy’: We should happily stake out a place for environmental philosophers at the border of philosophy, science, and policy. Yes, this means that we will continue to have problems with philosophers who will continue to argue that we are not doing real philosophy. But the way to make progress with these folks is not by struggling to live up to their sense of what constitutes philosophy, but rather by strengthen-
ing our ties to scientists and policy makers as philosophers. These groups don’t care much about what our erstwhile brethren think of what we are doing; they want to know if we can offer concrete help with the challenges they face. Proceeding in this way, we will gain greater status with these groups, and such status will influence a rebound within the philosophic community.

2. A policy turn: True, environmental philosophy has always had close ties to empirical matters. This is why the field has often been described—incorrectly, I believe—as a subset of applied ethics. (There’s little talk of applied aesthetics). But the empiricism of environmental philosophy has been oriented toward environmental science rather than policy. Even if they lack formal training, environmental philosophers are often familiar with an area of environmental science. An equal appreciation of the intersection of environmental philosophy and public policy is much less common. This needs to be remedied through coursework, internships, collaborative projects, and fieldwork.

3. Philosophical fieldwork: Socrates walked the agora; environmental philosophers should get their feet wet by doing fieldwork. At the University of North Texas (UNT) we are encouraging every graduate student to devote one chapter of their thesis or dissertation to a case study that topicializes the theoretical points that they are making. The chapter should field test the theory being developed, while also casting light on a scientific or policy issue. This point also underlies the creation of the UNT field station for environmental philosophy (http://phil.unt.edu/chile/).

4. Dual career training: Returning to the theme of (1) above, the best way for us to increase opportunities within environmental philosophy is for us to focus on opportunities outside of environmental philosophy. The National Science Foundation, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Park Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and a host
of regional and state organizations need help with what they call 'ethics and values' issues tied to environmental questions. We need to make a concerted effort to train our students to work in and with such organizations. If successful, new positions in philosophy departments will be needed to train students to do such work.

ENVIRONMENTAL MIDWIFERY AND THE NEED FOR AN ETHICS OF THE TRANSITION: A QUICK RIFF ON THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

Stephen M. Gardiner

It is worth remembering that in many ways environmental ethics is a very successful field. Over the course of only thirty or forty years, we have reached a point at which almost every significant philosophy program in the country offers a course in environmental ethics, there are several established and well respected journals, and the subject is regarded as one of the core areas of "applied ethics." This is quite an achievement; and one that is easy to forget. (When I listen to the complaints of environmental colleagues in other disciplines, or of philosophers working in many areas of applied ethics, I am vividly reminded.)

Still, there is a sense that the job is only half done. For one thing, although environmental ethics classes are ubiquitous, they are usually undergraduate survey courses taught by nonspecialists. For another, although good work appears in the specialist journals, it rarely makes it into the "mainstream" journals that most philosophers read. Finally, although environmental ethics counts as one of three or four core areas of applied ethics, environmental philosophers are rarely hired by (so-called) top departments (and if they are, it is often not because they are environmental philosophers, but because of the other things they do).

Now, many questions arise about this situation. One of them, of course, is whether there is some kind of "glass ceiling" on environmental ethics, and if there is, what causes it? Another is whether the core prob-
lem is that we’re just not all that good at environmental ethics (yet)? These are reasonable worries (about which my own views would be rather sanguine). But I am more concerned about another issue, which one might call that of “interfacing”.

The claim that environmental ethics has some problems in interacting with philosophy more generally, with allied disciplines, and with the wider public has been widely discussed in recent years, especially in the emergence of what has come to be called “environmental pragmatism.” There is something important about this debate, but my own sense is that it can become overblown. For example, when I teach my undergraduate survey course, mainly to nonphilosophers, they are, if anything, more excited about the Land Ethic, Biocentric Egalitarianism, and the worth of species than about climate change and sustainability. Still, there is something going on. However sympathetic they are to philosophy, I have the sense that my students (as well as my colleagues in other disciplines and the wider public) are dissatisfied. Having heard the critiques and the first set of grand visions, the new challenges and their problems, they want more. Irritatingly, they want to know what to do now—either how to turn grand visions into actions, or (more usually) how to successfully muddle through in the absence of a compelling grand vision. In short, they want an ethics for the transition.

For what it is worth, my sense is that the main task of an ethics for the transition lies somewhere between grand theory and pragmatism. What people are hoping for is a way to transform serious environmental concern into social change. But they want this transformation to be responsive to, reflective of, and integrated with wider values. Sensing that modern life has significant vices, but also major virtues, they wish to see environmental ethics synthesize their concerns in new and creative ways. In short, like a Socratic midwife, they want environmental philosophy to help them to articulate the way forward.

I’m sympathetic to the need for an ethics for the transition. I also think that taking on the task of articulating such an ethic may help the field to break through some of the institutional constraints now restricting it. But mainly it just seems to be a worthy topic in its own right. Environmental ethics should try to become an ethics for living now. In the nicest sense of the phrase, it should seek to “grow up.”
A FEW THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Lori Gruen

The potential of Environmental Philosophy to serve as an interdisciplinary bridge seems to be as strong as ever, and focusing on ways to enhance and expand philosophical engagement in multi/inter-disciplinary environmental projects is important. Continuing to develop work on environmental justice and eco-justice both theoretically and practically is one rich way to promote interdisciplinary engagement and expand the possibilities for environmental thinking more broadly. For example, environmental justice inquiry often attracts students to environmental philosophy and environmental science who would not ordinarily be interested in philosophy or science. Environmental justice issues also provide significant service-learning opportunities that can encourage students and faculty to develop more sophisticated ways of integrating theory and practice while working with local communities. Integrating service-learning projects into environmental philosophy/studies classrooms inevitably encourages the development of interdisciplinary skills that will serve faculty and students and allows for greater discussions of local environmental problems to be addressed both inside and outside the classroom.

As discussions of global justice, human rights, transnational feminism, and egalitarianism continue to gain prominence in philosophy, political science, feminist studies, and law, it is important that environmental philosophers continue developing ways to contribute to the dialogue. Environmental philosophers can certainly help enliven and deepen the practical as well as theoretical significance of these discussions. The new area of “cultural environmental studies” is one place this might happen, but it is certainly possible for environmental philosophers to engage in these analyses in other contexts.

Environmental philosophers have a tendency to look at large systemic issues, and as climate change becomes increasing pressing it is important not to ignore the particularity of risks and potential harms for different human communities as well as non-human animals who may be disproportionately impacted. Non-human animals are facing alarming dangers from anthropogenic environmental destruction. At the end of
2006, the baiji, or Chinese river dolphin, went extinct in the polluted Yangtze River; early in 2007, the UN reported an “emergency situation for the orangutan” in Borneo and Sumatra and experts predict their extinction within the next 20 years; dramatic climate events have had increasingly worrying impacts on isolated populations, from the whooping crane to the Asian elephant; unsustainable logging continues to threaten great apes and other species in Africa as more areas are opened for the trade in bushmeat; global warming is threatening the polar bear with extinction; recreational boating is decimating the manatees; and we can expect the losses to mount. Attending to the biodiversity loss as well as animal suffering must be a priority.

WHITHER ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY?
Dale Jamieson

By most reasonable standards, environmental philosophy has been an enormous success since its beginnings in the 1970s. Courses in the subject are now taught around the world, there are many opportunities for publishing, there are two dedicated graduate programs, and there are even some jobs in the field.

Yet these marks of success mask some problems. Environmental philosophy is fragmented along many dimensions and there are no widely shared standards of competence. The available jobs often go to surprising candidates whose skills and interests are extremely diverse. Too much publication appears in “specialist” journals, unnoticed by anyone but other contributors. Unconstructive debates, often reminiscent in tone, substance, and rancor of the old and new left, linger. In light of all this, I am no longer surprised when I meet people active in environmental studies and causes who claim to be environmental ethicists but who are almost entirely ignorant of the academic field that bears the name.

It is well known that the environment suffers because it is not a well-bounded domain (like the economy, for example), but is rather multi-dimensional and implicated in almost every area of human choice and action. This problem is reproduced in environmental philosophy,
which impinges on many fields, disciplines, and areas of inquiry, but is still struggling to find its own boundaries and identity.

One of the core challenges for environmental philosophy is to understand its audience and to whom it is responsible. Historically, the field grew out of the discipline of philosophy, but many who consider themselves environmental philosophers are hostile to the discipline as it is currently practiced. They don’t read the journals, go to the conferences, or try very hard to integrate their concerns into the discipline as a whole. Another possible home for environmental philosophy is environmental studies which is a self-consciously interdisciplinary field. Trouble is, environmental studies has many of the same problems as environmental philosophy without even a home discipline to secede from or rebel against. It also carries the added burden of delivering a respectable major to large numbers of eager, but often intellectually impatient, undergraduates. Perhaps one day environmental philosophy will be absorbed into an expanded field of bioethics, which increasingly sees itself as concerned not only with medicine, but with health, a concept that many believe applies broadly across the biosphere.

Some put their faith in “public philosophy” or the “policy turn.” I can hardly object. When pluralism, pragmatism and inherent value were all the rage in environmental philosophy, I was writing about climate change, zoos, and preserving urban landmarks. Yet it must be acknowledged that with the exception of Peter Singer (whom many would not consider an environmental philosopher), those who have touched the public most deeply in recent years have largely been writing about traditional philosophical concerns rather than about applied, practical, or interdisciplinary problems. Some examples: Paul Boghossian’s critique of relativism was favorably reviewed in much of the popular press, including The Wall Street Journal. Anthony Appiah’s Cosmopolitanism won the Arthur Ross Book Award from the highly influential Council on Foreign Relations. Books on free will and the philosophy of religion are everywhere; Daniel Dennett has almost become a household name. Most strikingly of all is Harry Frankfurt’s On Bullshit, originally a critique of deconstruction delivered to a Yale seminar in the 1980s, which beginning in 2005 spent 26 weeks on the New York Times best seller list. It’s enough to make you wonder what relevance is and whether it’s really relevant.

What is to be done? For fear of sounding like a third-rate marriage
counselor, the field needs communication and good will. These are the necessary building blocks for constructing a common sense of identity. The signs are encouraging but equivocal. The June conference in Colorado, now entering its fifth year, has been an important forum for communication, as has the International Society for Environmental Ethics meetings held in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association. At the same time, I am amazed at the proliferation of conferences, symposia, and organizations claiming to be about environmental ethics. Good will is also much more in evidence than it once was, but it will always be a challenge in a field that was largely established by people who consider themselves intellectual renegades and outlaws.

Finally, I want to emphasize the importance of taking these challenges seriously. I sometimes sense a certain complacency that flows from thinking that environmental philosophy must necessarily be important because the problems it addresses are so important. But this does not follow. Lazy, bad, marginal, and self-indulgent work can be produced in any area of inquiry, however trivial or profound. What does follow is that those of us who claim to address problems of such magnitude have a particularly strenuous obligation to do our work well and in a way that makes a difference. And this is a challenge that we have not yet begun to seriously face.

REFERENCES:
THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Irene J. Klaver

Environmental philosophy is invitational: it in-vites thinking into life as well as life into thinking. Life is vita in Latin—the same vita as in vital and in vitamins. An in-vita-tion leads to new connections, or a renewal of existing relations. This affects how we understand things. As Wittgenstein says, “understanding [...] consists in the very fact that we ‘see connections.’”1 This is the case for philosophy in general, it makes connections, reveals relations between entities, thoughts, and events, which elucidates our understanding. Environmental philosophy has (re-)opened certain realms of relevance to philosophical inquiry by foregrounding our connections to the non-human world. It accommodates the broadest invitation: of life itself, including our relation to the conditions of life.

The future of environmental philosophy lies precisely in this broad invitation. That means that it needs to occupy a profoundly interdisciplinary place, at the node of multiple institutions and practices. It deals with global issues on a local level and with the effects of local issues on a global scale. This involves science, policy, economy, law, ethics, aesthetics, religion, history, etc. An environmental philosopher is a specific generalist, someone who can connect various relations, sees the multiple angles in a particular perspective, the world in a grain of sand.

The evolved environmental philosopher is a translator, translating various concerns along multiple perspectives. Translation is crucial to an understanding of the viewpoints, positions, and situations of others. Environmental philosophy enlarges the category of the “other” with many more entities. This is not a politically correct move to bring so-called repressed voices to the fore, it is to evoke different modes of knowledge and experience, to enhance cultural imagination2, a crucial component to raising awareness about environmental concerns.

In her 1962 book Silent Spring3, Rachel Carson connected pesticide DDT to the decline in some predatory bird populations and sparked the rise of the environmental movement. She triggered a powerful cultural imagination by invoking a future silent spring without the singing of birds. Hegel saw the owl of Minerva as the symbol of wisdom, spreading “its wings only with the falling of the dusk.”4 That is, for Hegel understanding arises after the events, philosophy can never be prescriptive.
Environmental philosophy, on the contrary, is engaged thinking, its understanding arises out of the practices of the everyday. The albatross around our neck is of our own shooting. Environmental ethics and environmental justice might stake out basic prescriptive rules, but these are always born from knowledge of—if not a participation in—certain practices. Environmental philosophy’s bird is the spotted owl of social-political engagement, the canary in the mineshaft, but also the sparrow in the backyard. Birds that fly from dawn to dusk, seeing and reporting in the light the practical connections that reveal understanding, possible action, communication needs, and suggest a lexicon for translation. In and through practical connections rises therefore translation and understanding.

Understanding is a transformative process—it changes our interpretative frameworks. When we see connections we begin to understand how the dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico is related to agriculture in the midwestern United States thousands of miles away, with watersheds within the Mississippi River Basin draining nitrogen fertilizers into the Mississippi, causing hypoxia in the Gulf. Environmental philosophy shows how wetlands are not just wastelands but take nitrogen and phosphorus out of the water, buffer “our” coasts, and feed the migrating birds along their long routes. By not seeing these connections, our wetlands are pumped dry; and by abusing our water, springs disappear, major rivers strand in sand, and dead zones emerge in oceans and seas. “These, too, were silent, deserted by all living things,” Rachel Carson states, writing about streams. In the twenty first century it is no longer a “fable of tomorrow:” silent springs, silent rivers, silent seas.

Environmental philosophy is empirical philosophy dealing with big issues such as global warming, biodiversity, and sustainability, but always from concrete situations—questioning the ways we relate to the world, to the Earth. An environmental philosopher may participate, translate, and make connections. Think of it as an evolved role of endless invitation.

NOTES

5. The dead zone is a large area (6,000–7,000 square miles) in the Gulf of Mexico with an oxygen level too low for most aquatic species to survive. The oxygen depletion, called hypoxia, is mainly caused by nutrient enrichment from anthropogenic sources. This leads to eutrophication, that is, increased algal production in the ecosystem.


THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Eugene Hargrove

In my 1989 book *Foundations of Environmental Ethics*, I predicted that environmental philosophy would eventually come to an end because it would be adequately taken care of in mainstream philosophy. That is, it would become part of philosophy of science, ethics, aesthetics, social, and political philosophy, everything except perhaps logic, which could still use it as examples.

Whether there will still be a need for environmental philosophy outside of philosophy is another matter. A good deal of progress has been made in the biological sciences. Students frequently take courses in environmental philosophy these days, and those courses even have an effect on their general reasoning ability, making them better future scientists. There has not been, as far as I know, a similar willingness of departments and schools in the social sciences to provide their students the opportunity to take environmental philosophy, and most students still move into policy jobs without knowing that environmental philosophy even exists. I suppose that the school at Georgia Tech where Bryan Norton works might be an exception, perhaps providing some hope.

The problem with the social sciences, as I see it, is that these fields are based on an economic view that claims to have gone beyond philosophy even though it is really only a simplistic mix of utilitarianism, logical positivism, and pragmatism. Introducing environmental philosophy into these social sciences would likely undermine the self-conception of these
social scientists, causing them to have to reevaluate their approaches, which they are reluctant to do.

A work-around approach might be simply to create policy approaches in environmental philosophy that are so wonderful that the social scientists teaching economics, public administration, and other social sciences will be hypnotically drawn to them. This is apparently the preferred approach today among environmental philosophers who call for an emphasis on policy in environmental philosophy. They generally hold that the original contributors to the field of environmental philosophy did not realize the importance of policy and therefore wasted their time on useless distinctions. In reality, they did know policy was important but they didn’t know how to do it generally without the assistance of their disinterested counterparts in the social sciences. The development of the new policy-oriented approaches depends on whether the advocates can transition from “call-for” papers to actual results. Whether they can do so without active involvement from the social scientists controlling the policy graduate school curriculum remains to be seen. Medical ethics has been effective in large part because of the interaction between medical professionals and philosophers. A similar relationship between biologists and philosophers is now developing with good results in many cases, though the road is bumpy. The development of such relationships with social scientists is still on the horizon.

An area that I would like to see developed is both easier and more difficult: the introduction of value education into elementary schools. Environmental education at that level is generally done subversively. As one educator explained it to me, the idea is to teach values but in a way that neither the children nor their parents know that it is being taught. The object is to make children care about the environment emotionally. However, in order to avoid attack by conservatives and the religious right, no value words are used. The result in my view is emotivism. It can be seen in graduate students in the sciences who take a course in environmental philosophy. They have no vocabulary to understand what is being taught. Thinking about values makes their heads spin. If much of the things that have to be said to get them to relate could be introduced in elementary school, it would be commonplace when they arrived in graduate school. Doing so would be easy if the problem of the Culture War could be overcome.
THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Ben A. Minteer

I think we should be deeply concerned about the future of environmental philosophy. It is the most marginalized of the applied ethics fields (which are often marginalized as a whole within traditional philosophy departments) and with few exceptions, it still has not made significant inroads into neighboring territories—including schools of public policy, natural resources/environment, planning, life sciences, and so on. In my opinion, this is partly due to the general ideological pitch of the field and its narrow methodological orientation, at least historically. The neglect of alternative methods of inquiry, especially qualitative and quantitative work in the social sciences, is particularly troubling.

Environmental ethics also has an image problem. In my experience, most natural resource professionals, policy scholars, engineers, and life scientists view our field with considerable skepticism, shaking their heads at what they see as arcane debates that do not touch upon the issues and challenges that motivate their own work. Many of our colleagues in the natural and environmental social sciences, for example, have little patience for the kind of metaethical discussions about intrinsic value, moral pluralism, etc., that have captured much of our attention in the past. They do not see what these kinds of arguments contribute to the scientific, policy, and management curricula, or what they add to their graduate students’ training, or to their own research proposals. Typically, if a role for an environmental ethicist is recognized in such settings, it is often just to plug a personnel hole in an National Science Foundation proposal or to serve as a third or fourth reader on a graduate studies committee. Environmental ethics is at best an elective pursuit, it is not seen as essential.

I’ll be the first to admit that I have blood on my hands here (as do all of us, at least to the extent we have spent time and energy on debates over metaphilosophical issues in the field). And, of course, just because our environmental science and policy colleagues often do not see the true value of the field does not mean that it has no value. Still, I worry that the field seems to be falling into the chasm between traditional philosophy departments and environmental science, policy, and management programs. It is frequently deemed too applied and practical by many
philosophy departments, and too esoteric for schools of public policy, life sciences, and so on. This is not a good situation.

How can we fix the image problem? Perhaps one approach would be to develop more solid links with our bioethics cousins (both philosophically and institutionally). There is a revealing story here about the different fortunes of bio- and environmental ethics, and I think we might learn from the success of the former. There will be barriers to such an alliance, however, some of which are intellectual (e.g., the rejection of conventional ethical categories and theories by many environmental ethicists is not shared by most bioethicists) while others are institutional (e.g., What practical shape would a “clinical” model of environmental ethics take? What is the market for this service? and so on).

Another route would be to provide more organized and systematic attention to emerging, large-scale environmental science and policy issues—climate change, sustainability, poverty alleviation, and biodiversity loss, to name a few—that are (unfortunately, given their seriousness) viewed as “growth areas” in environmental science and policy studies. At my own institution (Arizona State University) we are moving away from an older departmental and disciplinary model to a more integrative institutional form and a transdisciplinary research culture. So, for example, we have a new school of global studies, a new school of sustainability, and so on. These are composed of a range of disciplines cutting across the natural, technical, and social sciences. There is certainly room in these initiatives and programs for a practical and progressive environmental ethics, but it must be conversant in subjects such as intergenerational equity, conservation science, economic valuation, environmental justice, and the normative dimensions of environmental science policy. I think there is an important role for us to play in these sorts of endeavors (which are popping up in various forms across the country) and I believe we should be creative and strategic about the contributions we can make to them.
THE PAST AND FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS/PHILOSOPHY
Bryan Norton

About 15 years ago, at one of the first meetings of the group known as the International Society for Environmental Ethics (ISEE) at American Philosophical Association (APA) meetings, I drew an analogy with the field of medical ethics, arguing that environmental ethicists should look beyond philosophy departments and seek liaisons with Schools of Forestry, Schools of Marine Science, and Environmental Studies Programs, and that philosophers should take a more active role in policy discussions and process. At that time, I was actively engaged in the actual policy processes, at the Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies, and perceived that: (a) These agencies desperately needed the kinds of conceptual and normative analysis philosophers could provide; but that (b) Practitioners of environmental policy did not find that the categories and concepts of traditional “metaphysical” approaches to environmental value provided them with useful guidance in policy decision making.

My urging gained me some heavy criticism, and even made me some enemies, as leading members of the environmental ethics establishment openly complained that my judgment—in seeing philosophy of environmental protection as needing a basis in analysis of possible actions—had been compromised by “spending too much time inside the beltway.”

Since those early years, I have watched my colleagues in environmental ethics debate this point, but mainly as a sideline to their metaphysical speculation. In the meantime, my colleagues in medical ethics have populated medical schools, formed liaisons with medical research institutions, and become regular commentators on newscasts about ethically controversial medical issues. Meanwhile, Chris Stone, the legal scholar, had his students do a word search of the Congressional Record over several years, and found almost no references to “environmental ethics.”

As I see it, there are three differences between the environmental ethics and the medical ethics cases: (1) Philosophers have responded to medical issues by engaging practitioners, while most environmental ethicists have become, at best, “token” members of philosophy departments and, whereas medical ethics practitioners tend to talk about decision cri-
teria ("informed consent", etc.), environmental ethicists continue to concentrate on the metaphysical foundations of environmental values; (2) The medical profession, beset with public controversies, recognized the need for more ethical discourse about medical choices, and actively embraced philosophers in their programs, whereas most environmental practitioners cannot see how philosophical analysis will help them to make better decisions; and (3) Being much wealthier than environmentalists, the medical schools and professionals were able to initiate positions and offer financial support, while environmental ethicists have to compete with other environmental researchers and commentators for small pots of funding.

While we can't do much about (3), we can, I assert, do a lot more about (1) and (2). With respect to philosophy departments, the trend may be (and in my view should be) toward developing joint appointments between philosophy departments and policy schools, forestry schools, and environmental studies programs. This will bring philosophers and students into more direct contact with real problems and the language of decision making, rather than metaphysics. And with respect to point (2), I continue to urge environmental philosophers to address real problems, rather than operating on an abstract level and then finding "applications" of these abstractions.

Philosophers, in other words, should become more "pragmatic" in their approach to both policy and philosophy. One aspect of this move is the need—after years of thinking of environmental philosophy as environmental ethics—to concentrate on epistemological, not metaphysical, aspects of environmental science and decision making.

Let me expand on this last point, because it seems to me to be the most important consideration affecting the future of environmental ethics, at least in the short and medium run. I think the central debates about whether nonhumans have "intrinsic value" will be (and should be) replaced with a vigorous discussion of the epistemology of all environmental values. Recently, two leading environmental philosophers, Baird Callicott and Mark Sagoff, have strongly endorsed what would traditionally be called "non-naturalist" approaches to the epistemology of environmental ethics. For Sagoff, this involved positing "ethical and aesthetic" facts which should guide environmental policy discourse away from any discussion of the utilitarian benefits of an improved environ-
ment. On the other hand, Callicott embraces "subjectivism," claiming that attributions of intrinsic value are based on personal whim—that one could, without reproach, attribute intrinsic = noninstrumental value to "an old worn-out shoe." These non-naturalist approaches, which rests on a sharp separation of empirical knowledge and ethical content, if followed, will certainly lead to a continued separation of environmental science, environmental philosophy, and environmental ethics. They also shift the debate from the type of value that environmental values are, to a debate about how one might justify a claim that some aspect of nature should be protected. In Sagoff's case, we need an account of how ethical facts are established. In Callicott's case, we need to explore whether and how environmental values (as construed by him) can have a rational impact on policy choices, since (presumably) I would be laughed off the stage if we insisted that public resources be devoted to saving my old shoes.

In my view then, it is time—way past time—that the discussions in environmental ethics should shift from metaphysics to epistemology. Characterizing environmental values does very little good if we have no way to support them with reasonable arguments. But now, with the rise of environmental pragmatism—which explicitly supports a naturalistic epistemology of environmental values—the debate needs to be about the prospects for providing philosophical and ethical advice to policy makers. That debate can only be joined if we develop, far more fully than has been done, a reason-based approach to justifying environmental goals and policies.

THE FUTURE OF GRADUATE EDUCATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY/ETHICS

Clare Palmer

In this brief paper, I focus on a specific area of the future of environmental philosophy and ethics (EP): graduate education. One way in which EP has substantially expanded in the past two decades is in the provision of graduate education, with a group of specialist Masters pro-
grams; a new PhD program at University of North Texas—University of Texas, Arlington; and a number of other universities now producing PhD graduates in EP. To keep the field growing and developing, new graduates must continue to enter it, both as academics and as environmental professionals informed by EP. In this context, I identify some questions, some challenges posed for EP by philosophy as an academic discipline, and some possible future strategies for developing EP at graduate level.

Questions

(a) Is there a need for the provision of more specialist Masters and PhD programs in EP?

(b) Are there key elements of EP with which all graduates (at PhD level, for example) should be familiar? If so, what are these key elements?

(c) How can information be made more widely available and accessible to those who want to undertake graduate work in EP?

(d) How can graduate students best be supported by those already working in EP while they are undertaking their graduate work (especially given the challenges below)?

(e) How can those currently working in EP best assist graduates entering the job market (whether this is in philosophy, in some other academic subject such as environmental studies, or professionally)?

Challenges raised by academic philosophy

1. The climate of academic philosophy: While this may have improved in the past few years, it’s reasonable to say that there is some skepticism about—and perhaps suspicion of—EP among “mainstream” analytic philosophers (and perhaps Continental ones as well). Doubts may concern the analytic rigor of EP (often in the context of applied philosophy more generally), or worries that the subject is peripheral to the “core” concerns of philosophy. Such worries have the particular implication that departments, in particular top philosophy departments, are
reluctant to hire in this area. This reluctance may be compounded by more systemic problems, particularly that Philosophy “ranking” systems (the Research Assessment Exercise in the United Kingdom, the Leiter rankings in the United States) are not particularly favorable to work in EP. While an Area of Concentration in EP might be a useful second string on the Philosophy job market, an Area of Specialization in the field will substantially restrict the number of job opportunities available.

2. Related challenges for graduate education in EP. Graduate students wanting to specialize in EP, but who work outside the departments in which this is a particular focus, may feel isolated and unsupported during their studies. On the other hand, students who carry out graduate work at the institutions that do focus on EP may find it difficult to get jobs in good philosophy departments, perhaps because of suspicions that such a specialist background may not have prepared students adequately for broader philosophical work.

Some possible strategies

There are, of course, many ways of answering the questions and addressing the challenges above. These are just a few suggestions:

(a) Ensure that graduate students who want a career in academic philosophy get a solid grounding in other areas of philosophy—in particular the “core areas” such as metaphysics, epistemology, and metaethics. It might be enough if graduate students take assessed courses in these areas. But there might be further advantages if they pursue a thesis topic where the environmental part of the thesis is illustrative, or an example of some much broader theoretical argument, so that it can be framed on the job market as not solely being a thesis in EP.

(b) For those working in EP professionally: Maintain supportive links with graduate students working in EP in other institutions, especially if they seem isolated. Remember to inform them about relevant upcoming conferences, and offer to read and comment on draft papers/chapters. The establishment of a more formal network/annual conference for graduate students in EP is worth considering, as is the provision of special
sessions for graduates at existing conferences in EP (such as International Society of Environmental Ethics and International Association for Environmental Philosophy conferences).

(c) Provision of information for prospective grad students in EP: There is already a website providing some information, run by Gene Hargrove at http://www.cep.unt.edu/other.html Those working in the field of EP could keep information flowing to Gene Hargrove so that he is able to maintain this site as new programs appear and faculty move around. It would be good to get some more international information too—more on Australia and New Zealand for instance, as well as EP opportunities in Continental Europe and Asia.

(d) Working with environmental studies departments: Given the challenges presented by academic philosophy, one possible route is to work on integrating EP concerns more deeply into environmental studies graduate programs; or to continue to develop links between philosophy departments and environmental studies departments. This might open up employment opportunities outside philosophy departments in environmental studies (or related disciplines such as geography) and may also be useful for students aiming at employment outside academia. There may already be models in existence for this.

CRITICAL ISSUES IN FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
Holmes Rolston, III

1. Sustainable development vs. sustainable biosphere. The question is whether to prioritize development within environmental constraints, or whether to prioritize a sustainable biosphere and work out a suitable economy within that priority. Sustainable development, likely to remain the favored model, is also likely to prove an umbrella concept that requires little but superficial agreement, bringing a constant illusion of
consensus and glossing over deeper problems with a rhetorically engaging word. Everybody co-opts the idea and justifies their desired developments. Sustainability will prove to be a “metafix” that will unite everybody including industrialists, subsistence farmers, fair-wage social workers, riverkeepers, wildlife lovers, economists, and politicians—all of whom wish to have their cake and eat it too.

In tension with this, a “sustainable biosphere” model demands a baseline quality of environment, with the economy worked out “within” such quality of life in a quality environment (clean air, water, stable soils, attractive residential landscapes, forests, mountains, rivers, rural lands, parks, wildlands, wildlife, renewable resources). Development is desired, but even more, society must learn to live within the carrying capacity of its landscapes. The fundamental flaw in “sustainable development” is that it sees the Earth as a resource only.

2. Global warming. Global warming is a threat of the greatest magnitude, involving an unprecedented convergence of complexities, natural and technological uncertainties, global and local interactions, and difficult scientific, ethical, political, and social choices. There are cross-cultural issues, intergenerational issues, distributional issues, concerns about merit, justice, benevolence, and about voluntary and involuntary risk. There is a long lag time from decades to hundreds of years. Surely but gradually, local “goods” cumulate into global “bads”. There are opportunities for denial, procrastination, self-deception, hypocrisy, free-riding, cheating, and corruption. Individual and national self-interests are at odds with collective global interests. This is the “tragedy of the commons” now taken at the pitch.

3. Biodiversity. Charismatic megafauna is likely to disappear, except in pockets. Conservation plans will increasingly need to incorporate local communities and governments in developing nations which are too unstable (if not corrupt) to insure long-range conservation. Fauna and flora generally are likely to become increasingly depauperate, due to development, pollution, ignorance, and disinterest outside of native-range industrial, medical, and agricultural resource benefits. The planet is likely to become less diverse, warmer, increasingly trashy, and weedy.

4. Escalating populations, escalating consumption, maldistribution.
These are three main global problems (driving for instance, global warming and depauperate fauna and flora). Global capitalism has no intrinsic capacities to solve these problems. A major problem is that products and capital move freely across national boundaries, but labor cannot, resulting in exploitation of cheaper labor. In addition to the human misfortunes produced by this system, such exploited peoples will progressively degrade their environments. As a result, both rich and poor will jeopardize both sustainability and conservation.

5. The “enough” problem. Humans have long been driven by desires to increase security and wealth. Humans have Pleistocene appetites for salt, sugar, fat, sex, and to maximize our short-term security for self and kin, and perhaps tribe. Without such concerns, people did not make it through winter. So humans always want more in order to make us more secure—more pay, bigger houses, better health, more preferences satisfied, more comfort, economic and national security. For all of human history, we have been pushing back limits.

Especially in the West, we have lived with a deep-seated belief that life will get better, that one should hope for abundance, and work toward obtaining it. In the West we have built this into our concept of human rights—a right to self-development, to self-realization. But such an egalitarian ethic scales everybody up and drives an unsustainable world.

Humans are not well equipped to deal with the sorts of global level problems we now face. The classical institutions—family, village, tribe, nation, agriculture, industry, law, and medicine—have shorter horizons. Humans have no evolutionary ability to deal with long-range problems on world scales. Many biologists think we are incapable of doing this at the ranges now demanded. A few educated persons can think and act at long-ranges, but to move six billion persons to a biospheric level of concern is difficult. Interestingly, the main historic institutions that show some capacity here are world religions.

6. Anthropocentrism versus intrinsic values in nature. Whether humans, one species among five to ten to 50 million on Earth, conserve nature only in their enlightened self interest or (also) with concern for the integrity of nonhumans is perennial and will remain important. Conservation of biodiversity is likely to prove partial and inadequate if grounded only in human benefits and without a more comprehensive respect for life
on Earth. Humans will remain morally naive so long as they live in a reference frame where one species takes itself as the center of value and values everything else relative to human reference frames. "Good for us" versus "good kind" and "good in itself" will remain a challenging issue in environmental ethics.

7. Human uniqueness. Humans as part of or apart from nature will remain a perennial issue. Humans are a unique species with unique capacities, as evidenced in language and culture, proved by their ability to place the planet in jeopardy, and proved by human concerns in environmental ethics. Placing humans in relation to the larger community of life on the planet will remain challenging, even paradoxical, with humans transcending spontaneous wild nature even as they seek to conserve such nonhuman nature.

FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHIES AND THEIR BIOCULTURAL CONSERVATION INTERFACES
Ricardo Rozzi

Perhaps it would be better to speak of the future of environmental philosophies, rather than of the future of environmental philosophy. Making explicit a plurality of future trends helps prevent an "Anglo-academic" bias, and emphasizes the need for further developing environmental philosophy into at least two directions: (1) a stronger dialogical interaction with the diverse international constellation of cultural, ethnic, social, political, economic, and ecological dimensions of environmental problems; and (2) a greater integration into the transdisciplinary field of biological and cultural conservation, involving an enhanced actualization of environmental theoretical philosophy into environmental practical philosophy.

1. Toward more multi-discursive international environmental philosophies

Further developing international environmental philosophy can help
to more precisely identify agents and causes of environmental problems, as well as their effects and victims. For instance, the focus on global climate change—and more generally global change, including other processes of rapid environmental transformation such as biotic, linguistic, and cultural homogenization—should not overlook the fact that different human communities, regions, societies, and countries are not equally responsible for such change nor suffer equally from its consequences. For example, today the highest levels of UV radiation fall on areas of Patagonia and the Antarctic Peninsula. These regions are the farthest away from the centers of CFC emissions which generate the stratospheric ozone hole found over the austral portion of the Americas.¹ The incorporation of these type of regional distinctions into environmental philosophy provides the opportunity for more precise diagnoses and characterizations of environmental problems than the still-frequent generalizations stated in terms of problems between “humanity and nature.”² Such a lack of specificity is deceptive because it absolves particular responsible agents of environmental problems by referring to all humans or society in general as responsible for them.

Secondly, contrasting ecological, social, and political settings generate not only different environmental problems, but also offer a variety of viable options for solving those problems. This is a point that remains frequently overlooked within global environmental agendas. While working in conservation in Latin America, I am continuously surprised by the marked ecological and cultural singularities I find in different localities in which communities have evolved peculiar ways of understanding, valuing, and interacting with their environments.³ On the one hand, environmental philosophy would enrich itself by further incorporating this biocultural diversity. On the other hand, environmental philosophy could provide a valuable contribution to biocultural conservation by better articulating the understanding the reticulate diversity of ecological knowledge and practices that indigenous and non-indigenous old-resident communities have co-evolved with particular ecosystems and historic and cultural settings around the world.

Finally, furthering the participation of environmental thinkers of different regions and strengthening environmental philosophy networks could contribute to an international dialogue that would generate more pertinent concepts and propositions by more deeply embracing local
social, historical, political, cultural, linguistic, and ecosystem realities. The
dynamic diversity of human ecological worldviews and practices has been
addressed by the field of environmental philosophy; however, this diver-
sity has still not been sufficiently incorporated as part of a multi-discursive community.

2. Incorporating environmental philosophy into the theory and praxis of biocultural conservation

During the last two decades, a main goal of ecological sciences and
biological conservation has been a better integration between human and
natural systems. Under currently prevailing scientific approaches, such
reconnection has been developed primarily through economic valuation
of "ecosystem services" (see, for example, the recent landmark Millennium Ecosystem Assessment). Environmental philosophy has had a weak
presence as compared to ecological economics in the transdiscipline of
biological conservation. This weak presence is mismatched with the
numerous calls made by ecologists about the need for environmental
ethics, and with the frequent reference to ethical values made by inter-
national environmental conventions. For instance, the text of the
Convention on Biological Diversity begins with a reference to the intrin-
sic value of biodiversity but it does not develop this notion at all. Similarly, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment mentions the intrinsic
value of biodiversity but does not develop the notion, and ends up justi-
fying the need for its conservation in terms of economic values. Stronger
participation from environmental philosophers could assist scientific
teams in incorporating a broader spectrum of epistemological and ethical
frameworks to understand and value human-natural systems. This repre-
sents a highly needed future direction for environmental philosophy,
which is also plausible given the increasing support being provided by
some science funding programs and agencies in the United States (e.g., the
National Science Foundation), and Latin America (e.g., Millennium Sci-
entific Initiative in Chile).

Among Latin American graduate students in conservation, as well as
among ecologists, some government authorities, and ecotourism and pro-
tected areas managers, I perceive a growing desire to better know and
incorporate philosophical notions into their approaches. By working on
such conservation teams, environmental philosophers could have a signif-
icant impact outside academic circles. At the same time, philosophical theoretical work would gain a closer attunement to empirical realities. Strengthening the notion of philosophers working in interdisciplinary and inter-institutional conservation teams with policy makers, scientists, government agencies, and non-government organizations in continuous processes where concepts and propositions are co-generated is critical to achieve the timely role that environmental philosophy should play in today’s dynamic social, economic, and ecological scenarios.

NOTES


5. The large scale initiative of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) begins its series of report books by stating that the MA “was carried out between 2001 and 2005 to assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being and to establish the scientific basis for actions needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable use of ecosystems and their contributions to human well-being.... The assessment focuses on the linkages between ecosystems and human well-being and, in particular, on ‘ecosystem services’” (p. vii, in *Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Current State and Trends, Volume 1*, 2005. Rashid Hassan, Robert Scholes, and Neville Ash, editors. Island Press, Washington D.C.). The notion of ecosystem services leads the valuation approach of the whole report.

A DEMANDING ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS FOR THE FUTURE

James P. Sterba

As we contemplate the present and future effects of global climate change, it is hard not to be disillusioned by what we see. Melting glaciers, rising sea levels, more intense and erratic weather patterns, wide-scale extinction of endangered species—what can we as environmental philosophers do that might be helpful in this regard? My suggestion is that we respond by drawing on the resources of traditional normative philosophy to ground a demanding environmental ethics that will justify the kind of sacrifices that are needed to cope with our unsettling future.

This is a project that, with a lot of help from others, I have been working on for the last twenty years. I will present it, at least in outline, in my presidential address at the APA Central Division Meeting next spring, entitled “Completing the Kantian Project: From Rationality to Equality.” By equality here I mean substantive intergenerational equality. This will require that we limit our current use of resources to simply meeting our basic needs. So the argument moves from a neutral nonmoral rational foundation to a very demanding set of practical moral requirements. So far sketched, the argument does not yet take into account the requirements that nonhuman living nature places upon us. But surprisingly, so demanding is this morality as sketched so far, that when additional considerations are introduced to take nonhuman living nature into account, not much more is required of us other than some further constraints on population policy.

Now I know some environmental philosophers are more skeptical than I am about the usefulness of traditional moral philosophy. Even I am unhappy with certain debates currently raging among contemporary moral philosophers, such as the realist/anti-realist debate. In fact, my argument is designed to make that very debate unnecessary. Still, if we leave most of traditional moral philosophy behind, what do we as philosophers bring with us to the new disciplines with which we now propose to collaborate? Do we bring an ability to do values clarification and a good sense of argument? I don’t think these skills and others like them alone will be enough for the task at hand. We need a very demanding ethics, and if we don’t look to philosophy to ground such an ethics, where do we look?
There is also an additional advantage here to grounding a demanding environmental ethics in traditional normative philosophy. Such an approach is more likely to force traditionalists and conservatives, philosophers and otherwise, to take notice of our arguments. If we are out in “left” field just talking to those both inside and outside of philosophy who happen to agree with our practical agenda, it is easier for us to be dismissed by others who are not committed to that same practical agenda. By contrast, if we address our opponents by appealing to very traditional values by which they claim to live their lives, then we do have at least a fighting chance of changing the way they do live their lives. At least, as moral philosophers, we would have then done our best to respond to the environmental crisis. Provided of course that we are also willing to reach out with our demanding ethics in hand and do that interdisciplinary collaboration that needs to be done to secure fully practical and effective solutions to the problems we face.

A CLEAR DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY?

William M. Throop

In discussions about the future of environmental philosophy, I have found myself supporting two positions that are in tension with one another. The first, which has been well explored in the last decade, is that environmental philosophy should have a more dramatic impact outside of academic circles. It should affect policy and guide the behavior of non-philosophers, which usually requires that it deeply engage the empirical details of problems it addresses. The second is that environmental philosophy needs to improve its status within the larger philosophical community, which requires its practitioners to use methods that dominate mainstream philosophy and to be conversant with contemporary work in ethical theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and continental philosophy. Some have argued that this tension places a double burden on those training to be environmental philosophers; they must demonstrate both theoretical and practical excellence. I fear that such a standard will limit
the growth of environmental philosophy. It will be daunting to new environmental philosophers and achieved by only a few.

With respect to this tension, I suggest that environmental philosophy should support a robust division of labor. Many new environmental philosophers should be recruited from cohorts trained primarily in core areas of philosophy. Most of these thinkers will probably focus on highly theoretical issues—issues that anyone in the field would recognize as philosophical. Their knowledge of environmental problems may be superficial and their audience likely will consist primarily of other philosophers. Their impact beyond philosophy may be quite limited (except for their students). I come from this tradition, and I am still delighted by the purely intellectual puzzles that our field generates. Work of this sort should be honored, but our field will be sterile if it is dominated by this kind of thought.

I hope that many other new environmental philosophers will be trained in interdisciplinary environmental graduate programs or “applied” philosophy Ph.D. programs where they will acquire the interdisciplinary expertise necessary to address practical problems and to effectively engage non-philosophical audiences. This group of “practical” environmental philosophers should also include a host of practitioners in other fields who contribute to philosophical dialogue. I suspect that much work in this area will be case-based, empirically sophisticated and, where it addresses non-philosophical audiences, more reliant on compelling metaphors than on tight arguments. I doubt that it is fruitful to view this group as applying the work of the former group. The aims, the sources of insight and the standards of quality for the two groups are categorically different. For practical philosophers, the political feasibility of a proposal matters, and the arguments must have the capacity to move relevant stakeholders. The results of this work may appear to be philosophy-lite to those in the first group, but only if judged by standards that are inappropriate if we accept a division of labor in the field.

This division of labor cannot be an apartheid. Many promising innovations in environmental philosophy will come from the interface between these groups. And unfortunately, a good bit of questionable work done in each group may result from a failure to understand progress that has been made by the other group. For example, philosophers focused only on theory may draw implications for action that fail to accord with current empirical information. Practical philosophers may
critique simplified metaethical positions that have long been abandoned in favor of more sophisticated versions. A healthy dialogue and a mutual respect should diminish these dangers. Such a division of labor has significant implications for graduate education, hiring and evaluation of faculty, and allocation of prestige within the field. The health and growth of environmental philosophy will depend on part on how we address these implications.

FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Victoria Davion

I agree with Baird Callicott that we still see many suggestions that we can deal with problems such as global climate change individually and voluntarily, and that this is hopelessly naïve. Obviously, many people aren’t even in a position to think about these issues, as daily survival is a problem. Hence, proclamations such as those in the most recent version of the Earth Charter (www.earthcharter.org), stating ideas such that we are all responsible for the future of our planet, and that we all belong to one human family are hopeless and useless. However, this leaves open the question of how to deal with serious issues such as global climate change. Baird is right we need to deal with issues of scale.

This brings me to some of the things that Bryan Norton and Bill Throop have mentioned. Bryan suggests that the fact that environmental ethicists have been too focused on metaphysical foundations of environmental values and have not focused enough on concrete empirical issues. I agree with Bryan here. However, Baird’s concern with how we are going to understand issues of scale necessary to deal with problems such as global climate change seems to bring us back to the need for a focus on metaphysical foundations of environmental values. Hence, I am having trouble with Bill’s idea that we can somehow split the labor between those who are involved with more concrete issues and those involved with issues of metaphysical foundational value. And, I am worried about what these more applied environmental ethicists will bring to the table, if they aren’t well grounded in philosophical traditions.

I agree with Bill that this places a great burden on students of envi-
ronmental philosophy, but I am not sure how to get around this burden. This brings me to Clare Palmer's comments. It is still true that many mainstream programs believe that environmental philosophy is simply second-string. It is important that undergraduates have a course available, but that’s about it. She is right to point out that in the days of Leiter, we need to have plenty of up-to-date information available for those who might be interested in environmental philosophy. However, I believe they will certainly need a strong grounding in the history of philosophy in order to be at all successful in academic philosophy, or particularly useful in collaboration on interdisciplinary projects. This will also require field training as several of our contributors point out. Again, I realize this places an increased burden on students, but I see no way around it.
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